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The reader is invited, then, to witness the debate over Aboriginal
self-government revealed through a cross-reading of these three texts. The
reader might also gain, however, from a reading informed by a sense of the
use to which discursive strategies are being employed in efforts to shape
debate, to channel it into safe and harmless forms, wherein the "reality" of
the current place of Aboriginal communities as internal colonies is not only
unquestioned, but reinforced. Perhaps, with this understanding, the
reader-faced with choices about how to understand these texts and
authors-can move into self-examination.
INDIGENOUS DIFFERENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION OF
CANADA BY PATRICK MACKLEM (TORONTO: UNIVERSITY
OF TORONTO PRESS, 2001)1
BY HEIDI LIBESMAN
2
Patrick Macklem's book explores the constitutional relationship
between Aboriginal people and the Canadian state, arguing that the special
features of this relationship mandate constitutional protection of
indigenous difference in the name of equality. It is a book full of the rigour
typical of the best academic scholarship and exhibits throughout the
concern and aspiration for justice on which law depends for its normative
power and integrity. With an approach that is pragmatic, contextual, and
principled, Macklem confronts all the difficult questions head-on.
The central organizing principle of Macklem's argument is the
principle of equality within a constitutional framework of distributive
justice. Constitutionalism is redefined in his work as a distributive
enterprise. "As a distributive enterprise, constitutional law implicates an
aspiration that power be distributed in a just manner."3 Justice is defined
by reference to the value of equality. As a result, everything in Macklem's
vision of justice turns on the meaning of equality. Drawing on authority that
I [hereinafter hidigenous Difference]. The reviewer would like to express many thanks to Ian B.
Lee and Brian Slattery for carefully reading drafts of this review, making many thoughtful and helpful
suggestions, and providing ongoing support, encouragement, and inspiration. Thanks also to David
B. Goldman, Terri Libesman, and James Tully for thought-provoking and encouraging response. Last
but not least, thanks to Linda Hutjens for her kind and meticulous proofreading of what was meant
to be the final draft. Any errors that remain are my own.
2 Visiting Scholar, Lauterpacht Research Centre for International Law, University of Cambridge;
D.Jur. Candidate, Osgoode Hall Law School.
3 Ibid. at 22.
[VOL. 40, NO. 2
Book Reviews
is both contemporary4 and as ancient as Aristotle' in western legal and
political thought, Macklem observes that equality demands that like cases
be treated alike and different cases be treated differently. Equality requires
that all potential recipients of a distribution be treated as equals unless a
valid reason exists, related to the good in question, for differential
treatment. The equality of a particular distributive choice has to be judged
in relation to the good that is being distributed. The good in question in this
case is constitutional power (rights and jurisdiction).6 The applicable group
claiming constitutional power is the indigenous peoples of Canada. The
question, therefore, is: are there any valid reasons that differentiate
indigenous peoples from other groups in the constitution of Canada that
would justify a pluralistic and non-uniform distribution of constitutional
power that accords to Aboriginal peoples rights and jurisdictions different
from those accorded to non-Aboriginal peoples? If this question can be
answered in the affirmative, then the presence of differentiated rights for
Aboriginal peoples in the constitution of Canada will not necessarily
contradict a constitutional commitment to equality. In fact, if the precept
of equality requires that like cases be treated alike and that different cases
be treated differently and a relevant difference between Aboriginal and
non-Aboriginal peoples is identified, a constitutional commitment to the
principle of equality would appear not only to be consistent with but to
actively warrant a pluralistic non-uniform redistribution of constitutional
power in Canada. The answer to this question, however, cannot be
philosophically deduced from the principle of equality. To make a
judgment about whether there are factors differentiating indigenous
peoples from other groups in the constitution of Canada, which support
their case for distinct rights and jurisdiction, it is necessary to review the
relationship between indigenous peoples and the constitution of Canada.
This is where history becomes constitutionally relevant and Macklem's
summation of the relevant history in terms of "the four complex social facts
that define indigenous difference" 7 absolutely central. In fact, these four
social facts, from a normative perspective, are so central to the struggle of
indigenous peoples for recognition and Macklem's argument that they bear
repeating:
4 See e.g. M. Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York: Basic
Books, 1983) [hereinafter Spheres ofJusticel referred to by Macklem, Indigenous Difference, supra note
I at 28.
5 See Indigenous Difference, ibid. at 29, referring to Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics.
6 See ibid. at 21 for a more detailed description of what Macklem means by constitutional power.
Ibid. at 4.
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First, Aboriginal people belong to distinctive cultures that were and continue to be
threatened by non-Aboriginal beliefs, philosophies, and ways of life. Second, prior to
European contact, Aboriginal people lived in and occupied North America. Third, before
European contact, Aboriginal people not only occupied North America; they exercised
sovereign authority over persons and territory. Fourth, Aboriginal people participated in
and continue to participate in a treaty process with the Crown.8
Macklem's argument is that these four complex social facts lie at
the heart of the relationship between Aboriginal people and the Canadian
state. They are the crucial evidence in the case for the existence of a
relevant difference between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples with
implications for the constitution and the distribution of rights and
jurisdictions in Canada.
Throughout the book, Macklem steers clear of simplistic
generalizations that overlook the relevant differences between Aboriginal
people and other groups who have suffered unjust treatment and continue
to experience discrimination. For instance, he avoids contrasting Aboriginal
people with other "voluntarily incorporated" Canadians. Macklem notes
the existence of groups, such as refugees and descendants of slaves, who
cannot adequately be comprehended in the framework of overgeneralized
antitheses and homogenizing genealogies that fail to recognize relevant
differences within non-Aboriginal Canada and instead simply distinguish
between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people.9 He avoids both the error
of essentializing Aboriginal identity't and of imagining Canada in an
irremediably imperial-colonial framework." Critiques of essentialism work
both ways and liberate the imagination of Canada, as much as the
imagination of Aboriginal peoples, from fixed representations that petrify
meaning outside the flux of time, the realities of change, and the
possibilities of transformation.
Macklem's book can be read on many levels. The pragmatic and
normative dimensions of his inquiry are not exclusive but analytically
distinguishable. A practical concern for ameliorating injustice leads
Macklem not to exclude any existing sources of legal protection even as he
critically questions the implicit normative justifications of potentially
8 Ibid. at 4. See also ibid. at 167.
9 See e.g. his discussion in ibid. at 47, 48, 73, 129-31.
10 In addition to Chapter Two, see ibid. at 169-70 where Macklem critiques frozen-rights
approaches to the constitutional protection of cultural identity and difference.
Although I do not discuss Macklem's approach to the Charter in this review, his anti-
essentialist thesis is applied illuminatingly in that context, acknowledging on the one hand the danger
of the Charter being used to authorize "judicial reorganization of Aboriginal societies according to
non-Aboriginal values" and, on the other, resisting fixing the Charter within a culturally imperialistic
framework. See ibid. c. 7 especially at 194-95.
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supportive doctrine within positivist frameworks. For example, he
questions, at the normative level, grounding Aboriginal rights in the logic
of prior occupancy but does not exclude this line of reasoning because a
critique requires a more general and principled review of law based on this
logic and not simply the arbitrary exclusion of Aboriginal people from its
general application. 12 If non-Aboriginal people are protected by law based
on this logic, then a valid reason must be shown for not applying it to
Aboriginal people. Macklem suggests that the reasons that have been
offered historically are based on unjustified and unjust assumptions (for
example, racial discrimination and Aboriginal peoples' cultural inferiority)
and, therefore, cannot withstand scrutiny unless other defensible reasons
can be offered, or questions of justice are deemed irrelevant to the
constitution of law. In each chapter, he systematically discusses textual
references and judicial interpretations1 3 consistent with a belief that power
be distributed in a just manner and amenable to supporting the protection
of Aboriginal interests, whatever the internally stated legal reason.
Macklem's project, though, is much more ambitious than "simply"
providing an extensive resource of pragmatic strategies grounded in text,
structure and precedent for furthering the recognition and protection of
Aboriginal interests in culture, territory, and sovereignty. The book is much
more than a socially and politically conscious and concerned orchestration
of legal technical virtuosity for externally justified ends. Macklein is
concerned with reintegrating law with justice and in doing so recovering the
ethical integrity of Canadian constitutionalism from the betrayals of justice
that Canadian law has incorporated into its own logic of sovereignty and
authorized in relation to Aboriginal peoples because they did not conform
to falsely universalized cultural preconceptions of humanity. These
betrayals include the dispossession of land and laws, breach of treaty
obligations, denial of jurisdictional authority, destruction of the cultural
medium in which law's meaning is embedded, destruction of beliefs,
traditions, languages and ways of life, forced removals of communities, and
break-up of traditional community and family structures. These values, and
12 See e.g. ibid. at 85 and surrounding argument.
13 In terms of case analysis and legal texts, Macklem's primary focus is on the doctrinal
development of Aboriginal rights, treaty, and Charter jurisprudence relevant to Aboriginal peoples in
Canada. Here his book could serve, if nothing else, as an excellent companion commentary. Less
comprehensively but still incorporated into the analysis is reference to U.S. jurisprudence and history
(particularly pre-twentieth century). Relevant instruments, doctrines, and precedents in international
law are also discussed. There is occasional reference to other Commonwealth jurisdictions, in
particular Australia post-Mabo. See Mabo and Others v. Queensland (No. 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 (H.C.
Aus.). Notwithstanding the focus on Canada, the cross-fertilization of doctrine, precedent, and ideas
in Commonwealth history and jurisprudence makes Macklem's text clearly relevant beyond the
Canadian context.
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the underlying recognition of humanity on which they are predicated, are
what are at stake in the struggle for recognition and renewal of Aboriginal
interests in culture, territory, and sovereignty. They implicate not only
Aboriginal peoples but the value structure of Canadian law and society.
It is these broader concerns that lead Macklem to move beyond
questions of validity in a positivist framework and engage questions of
legitimacy in a constitutionalist framework.14 In many ways, his work can be
read as a protest against the positivist alienation of questions of value and
meaning from the constitution of law. He manifests this protest by
continually questioning the normative reasons that ground positivist validity
(and legal order) in deeper references of meaning and ultimately the
horizon of justice, which for him means distributive justice normatively
integrated by a commitment to equality. Jurisprudence has to incorporate
critical response-ability in relation to normative questions concerning law's
justice and meaning if the presumptive habits of obedience on which
"normal" legal order rests are to resist disintegration into arbitrary and/or
coercive orders of power when challenged or questioned. For law to
manifest legitimacy, it must express itself and aspire to become an integral
order of justice and meaning. 15 The distinguishing claim of Macklem's book
is to provide normative justification for a redistribution of constitutional
power in Canada responsive to indigenous difference as a question and
requirement of fundamental justice.
It is sometimes argued from a liberal constitutional viewpoint that
recognition of differentiated group rights by definition contravenes the
norm of equality and cannot be reconciled with a constitutional theory of
justice that is normatively structured by a fundamental commitment to
equality. From this perspective, recognition of indigenous difference
appears, at best, conceptually anomalous--a puzzling exception to a
baseline normative commitment to equality in modern liberal and social
democratic traditions of constitutionalism. Macklem's work is a book-
length exposition of the conceptual and normative flaws of this thesis. His
approach is self-consciously differentiated from philosophical theories of
justice that abstract from history and contemporary social realities. In this
respect, his approach has greater affinity with the more historically
conscious theories of Habermas, Walzer, and Taylor16 and intercultural
14 Indigenous Difference, supra note I at 151: "text alone does not resolve questions concerning
the justice of existing constitutional arrangements; it merely clarifies what requires justification."
15 See B. Slattery, "Law's Meaning" (1996) 34 Osgoode Hall L.J. 553.
16 See e.g. J. Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theoty, ed. by C. Cronin
& P. DeGreif (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998); Spheres of Justice, supra note 3; and C. Taylor,
Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition ": An Essay (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
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constitutionalists like Slattery, Borrows, and Tully 7 than the more
decontextualized theories of Rawls or Dworkin. 8 Although many of his
arguments and his constitutional methodology can be applied to other
contexts (for example, adjudicating the justice of recognizing Quebec
difference), Macklem makes a point of emphasizing that questions of
justice cannot be resolved in abstraction from history. For example, he
argues that in evaluating claims to sovereignty based on principles of formal
and substantive equality, it is impossible to assess the justice of these claims
without reference to history and contemporary social realities. 9 This also
explains the centrality of the four social facts that define indigenous
difference in his thesis. Historical consciousness is a source of hermeneutic
discernment in the jurisprudential process of evaluating the justice of a
particular claim to differentiated or assimilative recognition.
Macklem also distinguishes his approach from classic universalist
and relativist positions. Although he presents himself as "sidestepping ' 20
the universalist-relativist debate, his approach is perhaps better
conceptualized as an intermediation rather than an avoidance of the
debate. Macklem's work can be understood as a response to the search for
an intercultural jurisprudential logic capable of mediating and adjudicating
differing approaches to the recognition of indigenous difference in the
constitution of Canada as a matter of justice rather than power.
Understood in this way, his approach cannot avoid the question of common
1992).
17 See e.g. B. Slattery, "The Organic Constitution: Aboriginal Peoples and the Evolution of
Canada" (1995) 34 Osgoode Hall L.J. 101 [hereinafter "Organic"]; J.J. Borrows, "A Geneologyof Law:
Inherent Sovereignty and First Nations Self-Government" (1992) 30 Osgoode Hall L.J. 291
[hereinafter "Geneology"]; and J. Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity
(New York; Cambridge University Press, 1995) [hereinafter Strange Multiplicity].
18 See e.g. J. Rawls,A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 1999); R. Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986). At the
same time, Macklem draws and synthesizes into his work both Dworkin's reflections on the meaning
of equality and Rawl's reflections on the conditions of just order. See e.g. Indigenous Difference, supra
note 1 at 31, n.61. See also e.g. ibid. at 157, where Macklem, following Robert Williams, imaginatively
applies Rawl's theory to assessing the justice of treaty distributions of sovereignty: "relying on
hypothetical consent enables the separation of questions relating to actual constitutional arrangements
from questions relating to the justice of such arrangements." Macklem argues that this approach is
particularly valuable in contexts where treaties negotiated between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples
are manifestly unjust and can only be explained by factual domination of power. In particular, for
Macklem's discussion of extinguishments clauses, see ibid. at 158.
19 A comparison can here be drawn with James Anaya's approach to the remedial dimensions
of self-determination in S.J. Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1996) [hereinafter International Law]. See also B. Slattery, "The Paradoxes of
National Self-Determination" (1994) 32 Osgoode Hall L.J. 703.
20 Indigenous Difference, supra note I at 40.
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horizons (the search for overlapping normative consensus) at the heart of
the struggle for a just reconciliation of the universal with the particular,
even if the answer he gives escapes the perils of philosophical
indeterminacy and historical overdetermination. Indeed, that is the virtue
of his approach. Ultimately, his work is a wager on an affirmative answer
to the question: can the quest for right become a question of dialogue and
translation between conflicting interpretations, a struggle between
competing meanings won by reference to historically conscious reason and
bound by universally liberating horizons of justice, rather than coercive
power and factual capacity to dominate and suppress (for example, through
unfair rules of evidence)" the human will-to-meaning of the other?
Questioning the legitimacy of prevailing distributions of
constitutional power (rights and jurisdictions) in Canada in relation to
Aboriginal peoples is not simply a deconstructive exercise. It is also a
reconstructive exercise rooted in the possibility of redefining the
relationship between Aboriginal people and the Canadian constitutional
order in terms that do greater justice to both Aboriginal people and the
many other people who live in Canada. The genuine challenge posed by
Aboriginal peoples is converting the social fact of sharing Canada into a
value and vision of coexistence that overcomes past injustice and builds
feelings of mutual respect and solidarity rather than mutual alienation,
resentment, and guilt between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples.22
Macklem makes a significant contribution to this project of reconciliation
and reconstruction in four especially significant ways.
First, Macklem develops a normative theory of justice (distributive
justice governed by the principles of substantive and formal equality) that
can serve to mediate the legal and political processes of working out a more
just distribution of constitutional power in Canada. The essence of his
argument is that the principles of substantive and formal equality have the
capacity to engender a significant degree of cross-cultural normative
consensus to mediate and adjudicate conflicting claims for recognition
between the plural, overlapping communities that constitute Canada. These
principles do not answer in themselves the question of whether a particular
21 For example, the exclusion or devaluation of oral histories prior to Delgamuukw v. British
Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 [hereinafter Delgamuukw], or the textualization of treaties and rights
in normative languages alien and alienating vis-h-vis Aboriginal understandings. On Delgamuukw and
historic exclusion of oral evidence, see Indigenous Difference, supra note 1 at 90, 148-49. On the
traditional tendency to interpret abstract treaty rights with reference to non-Aboriginal norms and
values, see ibid. c. 5 at 136-40 to review Macklem's discussion of treaty jurisprudence. For the
discussion on Charter jurisprudence, see ibid. c. 7 at 195ff.
22 Macklem does not engage Cairns in his work but a fruitful dialogue is opened by this question
between his book and A.C. Cairns' book, Citizens Plus (Vancouver: The University of British Columbia
Press, 2001).
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distribution is just, but they do provide a mutually intelligible framework
for mediating conflicting interpretations of what justice requires in any
particular case. The problem with hegemonic liberal and social-democratic
interpretations of the norm of equality is that they fail to recognize that
equality has to be judged both in relation to the good to which it is being
applied and with a consciousness of the history of the relationship between
the good in question and the individual or group claiming the good-in this
case, the history of the relationship between indigenous people and
constitutional power in Canada. Macklem convincingly shows that equality
properly understood is a norm that requires context-sensitive
differentiation and not uniform distributions of rights and jurisdictions.
Macklem's second contribution relates to his acknowledgement of
the distributive power of law. Legal outcomes are not inevitable realities
but the contingent result of discernable normative choices and historically
bound political struggles. In this respect, Macklem's work intersects with
and draws on the deconstructive work of neo-realist critical legal scholars23
in exposing the ideological function of law in stabilizing distributions of
power. But he does not accept as inevitable or essential the legitimation
crisis posed by law's historic complicity in unjust distributions. Instead, he
harnesses this insight to focus on the possibilities and vocational
responsibility of law in reconstructing relations of redistributive justice.
Macklem's critique, in other words, is not simply an exercise of
delegitimation and deconstruction, but a project of potential relegitimation
aimed at regenerating a meaningful relationship between law and justice.
It must be emphasized that this is not simply an instrumentalization of the
ideological function of law in society, but involves redefining the
constitution of law so that the ethical relation between law and justice
becomes integral to the meaning of law. By defining law in relation to
justice, it cannot be reduced to its ideological function of stabilization. This
is because justice is never a completely fulfilled reality. Justice in relation
to law is both the aspiration of law that integrates law's meaning over time
and, at the same time, a never-ending source of critique. Justice, in other
words, inspires the vision and the revision of law's meaning over time.
Law's meaning is constituted through the ethical relationship between law
as an extant reality and the becoming of law as justice, which is infinite. The
23 Macklem refers in particular to the works of D. Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997) which argues that non-regulatory understandings
of the common law conceal its distributive dimension and naturalize existing distributions; J.W. Singer,
"Property and Social Relations: From Title to Entitlement" in G.E. van Maanen & A.J. van der Walt,
eds., Property Law on the Threshold of the 21st Century (Apeldorn: Maklu, 1996) 69; and D. Kennedy
& F. Michelman, "Are Property and Contract Efficient?" (1980) 8 Hoftstra L. Rev. 711. References
to the above are in Indigenous Difference, supra note I at 98, n.66 and also in his discussion of the
positive dimensions of constitutional rights, ibid. at 237-38.
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surplus of law's meaning in relation to justice is, as I read Macklem, the
sense of his repeated calls for law, especially constitutional law, to be
viewed not as "a static body of manifest legal rules"2 a(the error of
positivism) but as "an active, evolving and interpretive inquiry ...
disciplined but not determined by text, structure or precedent. 25 The same
point is mirrored in his discussion of international law.26 It is also implicit
in Macklem's characterization of "constitutional law as more than a limited
number of textual and structural imperatives and a finite set of legal rules
that passively constrain the exercise of political power.' 27
The third contribution Macklem makes is to demonstrate the
creative and mutually constitutive synergy of law and politics. Law is
neither reducible to politics nor completely separate from politics. The
history of indigenous difference in the constitution of Canada shows how
law can become complicit in stabilizing relations of domination and
perpetuating injustice, but Macklem is also interested in showing how legal
artifice can play an important role in conditioning and mediating the
inequalities of power that can inflect and often deflect political discourse
and historical choice along trajectories of vested interest rather than paths
of genuine dialogue and justice. Macklem's discussion of the significance
of distributions of constitutional power for setting baseline entitlements in
negotiations between Aboriginal peoples and the Crown is one of the best
demonstrations of this thesis.28
The book's fourth contribution is to refute any simplistic opposition
between idealistic concerns with justice and pragmatic concerns with
stability. The distribution of constitutional power in Canada raises
foundational and framework questions; however, these questions do not
imply an irremediable illegitimacy in the constitution of Canada that
necessitates either forgetting the past or being imprisoned by remembrance
of past injustice. The status quo does not exercise a monopoly over the
possibilities of stable legal order.29 Questioning sovereignty does not have
to mean expulsion into a state of nature or suspension of the constitutional
24 Indigenous Difference, ibid. at 36.
25 Ibid. at 36, 23 respectively.
26 Ibid. at 36.
27 Ibid. at 21. These are just sample references. The point is illustrated at many points in the
book. See e.g. ibid. at 163-64.
28 For the relevant text, see ibid. 95-98. See also ibid. at 198, "judicial developments in the law
of Aboriginal title ... have dramatic distributive effects on Aboriginal power.
29 On this, also see B. de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Common Sense: Law, Science and Politics
in the Paradigmatic Transition (New York: Routledge, 1995), which discusses the politics of definition
in relation to characterizations of order and chaos. See specifically ibid. at 25-26.
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order in a revolutionary interregnum between the rejection of an old order
and the foundation of a new order. Neither does it have to threaten the
territorial integrity of the Canadian constitutional order. The wonderful
paradox of recognizing indigenous difference (and the same might be said
in relation to Quebec difference) is that it has the potential to strengthen
the unity of the Canadian legal order through redressing the injustices that
attenuate allegiance and that break down feelings of shared destiny and
common belonging between Aboriginal peoples and non-Aboriginal people
in Canada. The Canadian constitutional order, Macklem argues:
owes its origins to a European world-view that regarded Aboriginal nations as insufficiently
civilised to merit membership in the community of nations. As a founding principle of a
modern state, a belief in Aboriginal inferiority casts long shadows over the legitimacy of
Canadian claims of territorial sovereignty. In contrast, recognising constitutional
significance of indigenous difference equates difference with equality. In so doing, it extends
a measure of constitutional legitimacy not only to the fact of indigenous difference but to
the Canadian constitutional order itself.3
To understand this claim, we must rejoin Macklem's discussion of
sovereignty and the treaty process in his conclusion. Drawing on the work
of Barsh and Henderson,31 and in line with contemporary scholars,32
Macklem argues for a reinterpretation of the history of Canadian
sovereignty that moves beyond both narratives of conquest and fictions of
discovery. He argues for a "flexible interpretation 3 3 of sovereignty to
overcome the false link between the affirmation of Aboriginal sovereignty
and the negation of Canadian sovereignty. Instead of this either/or logic,
Macklem proposes rethinking sovereignty in terms of a federal or treaty
paradigm of constitutionalism in which sovereignty is not absolute or
30 Indigenous Difference, supra note 1 at 288.
31 See in particular references to R.L. Barsh & J.Y. Henderson, The Road: Indian Tribes and
Political Liberty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980) in Indigenous Difference, supra note
1 at 153, 159.
32 See e.g. Strange Multiplicity, supra note 16; "Organic", supra note 16; J. Webber, "Relations of
Force and Relations of Justice: The Emergence of Normative Community Between Colonists and
Aboriginal Peoples" (1995) 33 Osgoode Hall L.J. 4; International Law, supra note 18; K. McNeil,
"Envisaging Constitutional Space for Aboriginal Governments" (1993) 19 Queen's L.J. 95; R.A.
Williams Jr., LinkingArms Together:American Indian Treaty Visions of Law and Peace, 1600-1800 (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1997) [hereinafter LinkingArms]; "Genealogy", supra note 16; Canada,
Report of the Royal Commission onAboriginal Peoples, 5 vols., (Ottawa: Minister of Supple and Services
Canada, 1996) (Co-chairs: R. Dussault & G. Erasmus) [hereinafter Report]; and Canada, Partners in
Confederation: Aboriginal Peoples, Self-Government, and the Constitution (Ottawa: Canada
Communication Group, 1993) [hereinafter Partners in Confederation].
33 Indigenous Difference, supra note I at 108-12.
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unitary but relational and divided between a plurality of jurisdictions. 4
Understood in this way, treaties with Aboriginal peoples are not simply
distributions of delegated state power rooted in a presumption of Crown
sovereignty over Aboriginal peoples beyond the province of jurisprudence
(as positivist hermeneutics of federal jurisdiction have traditionally
assumed)35 but instead constitutive elements of Canadian constitutional
authority. By conceiving treaties as constitutive constitutional accords,
rather than agreements rooted in a monistic and exclusive source of original
constitutional authority and normative order, it becomes possible for us to
imagine treaties as framing and expressing normative commitment to
building a constitutional culture of mutual recognition and legal pluralism36
rather than colonial domination and negation of First Nations.37
Although Macklem does not say this explicitly, in this conception
the unity of the Canadian legal order is not. a superimposed identity (a
static "is") but resides in the relationship between the diverse communities
that constitute Canada. Similarly, the history of Canada is not the history
of one nation-community but the history of the hybrid relations between
the multiple overlapping and interacting communities that constitute the
community of Canada. The myth of indivisible Crown sovereignty gives way
to the reality and ideal of not only federal distributions of sovereignty,
founded on a logic of conquest or discovery, but the inherently federal
constitution of original Canadian sovereignty rooted in a remembered
history and logic of mutual recognition and pluralistic accommodation. As
such, a way is opened up for recognizing Aboriginal constitutional authority
and normative worlds without undermining the foundations of Canadian
constitutional authority. The fear, as old as Hobbes, at the bottom of the
modern act-of-state doctrine-that the only alternative to chaos is
authoritarian order-is revealed for what it is in contemporary Canadian
constitutionalism: a refuge not from the spectre of violence and civil war
but from questioning the meaning and justice of preconceived thoughts and
inherited distributions of constitutional power. Macklem shows not only
34 See e.g. ibid. at 154. For a comparable view, see "Organic", supra note 16 at 111: "aboriginal
treaties not only contributed in a general way to the evolution of the Constitution, but also supplied
part of its federal structure. This situation, sometimes described as 'treaty federalism,' has now been
formally recognized and consolidated in section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982."
35 See Macklem's discussion in Indigenous Difference, ibid. c. 4. Note also ibid. at 167: "the
judiciary tends to assume the constitutional legitimacy of the assertion of Canadian sovereignty over
Aboriginal people, and Van der Peet is no exception." See R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507.
Macklem argues that more recent jurisprudence continues, despite s. 35, to be predicated on this
assumption.
36 Indigenous Difference, ibid. at 155.
37 For a comparable view, see B. Slattery's work in "Organic", supra note 16.
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that contemporary Canadian jurisprudence "can no longer shirk the task of
assessing the constitutional significance of Aboriginal prior sovereignty,"
38
but that such questioning provides a historic opportunity for extending a
"measure of constitutional legitimacy not only to the fact of indigenous
difference but to the Canadian constitutional order itself.,
39
I have only three critical remarks in relation to Macklem's
argument. First, his theory may require more attention to be paid to the
evolution of the historiographical consensus that he describes in terms of
the four social facts that define indigenous difference. These four social
facts are vital to recognizing the justice of indigenous peoples' struggle for
recognition but they have not always been reflected in the narration of the
relationship between Aboriginal peoples and the constitution of Canada.
Their status as social facts, in other words, perhaps requires more explicit
acknowledgement that their recognition is rooted in and dependent on a
paradigm shift in Canadian constitutional historiography and historical
consciousness. Macklem's argument requires a measure of intercultural
consensus, not only at the level of basic principles of justice (to which he
responds with the principles of substantive and formal equality and a
redefinition of the constitutional enterprise in terms of distributive justice),
but also in the historical narration of Canada. This is an ongoing project
rather than an accomplished reality and cannot be taken for granted in the
context of the traditional historiographical exclusion of Aboriginal peoples
from the narration of Canada. It also requires differentiation from both
relativist denials of truth in history and positivist denials of value in
historical representation.
My second remark concerns the relative weight that Macklein
places on the principles of equality and self-determination. While he
provides an illuminating discussion of the principle of equality, his
38 Indigenous Difference, supra note I at 118. The reason why this is so significant is because as
Slattery argues and Macklem underlines: "[c]ourts cannot take refuge in the act of state doctrine
without forfeiting their moral authority and acting as passive instruments of colonial rule." Slattery is
quoted in ibid. at 118 from his own article, "Aboriginal Sovereignty and Imperial Claims" (1991) 29
Osgoode Hall L.J. 681 at 692. The integrity of Canadian constitutionalism is at stake.
Indigenous Difference, ibid. at 288. In fact, on this point, Macklem's work should be read in
conjunction with the works of Slattery, the late Howard Berman, the more recent work of Robert
Williams Jr., James Tully, and the historiography of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples,
which makes it possible to see the project of post-colonial constitutionalism not simply as a break from
the past, but as a recovery and continuation of a trajectory buried in the eclipse of the formative treaty
era in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For samples of these works, see B. Slattery, "The
Hidden Constitution: Aboriginal Rights in Canada" (1984) 32 Am. J. Comp. Law 361; "Organic",
supra note 16. See also H. Berman's essay in 0. Lyons et al. eds., Exiled in the Land of the Free:
Democracy, Indian Nations, and the U.S. Constitution (Sante Fe, Cal.: Clear Light Pub, 1998)_;
Linking Arms Together,supra note 31; Final Report, supra note 31; and Partners in Confederation, supra
note 31.
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discussion of the principle of self-determination remains largely within the
parameters of prevailing legal interpretations (albeit on the critical edge)
and does not have the same philosophical depth.4" We know from previous
discussion that Macklem frames his argument for the recognition of
indigenous difference through the relationship between equality (which
requires like cases to be treated alike and different cases differently) and
constitutional power (the good in question which becomes the hermeneutic
lens for judging the relevance of the difference in question). In order,
though, to understand the value of constitutional power, Macklem's
argument requires the idea of self-determination-understood not simply
in terms of conventional descriptions of the phenomenon, such as internal
or external self-determination, but in its deepest significance as a
constitutive human value. Without this deeper sense of self-
determination-which serves to link and integrate Macklem's conception
of justice and equality to a liberating vision of humanity-it is difficult to
appreciate, on a normative level, why distributions of constitutional power
ultimately matter.
Why, then, does Macklem hesitate to use the language of self-
determination in articulating his argument? This brings me to my final
remark. Macklem provides us with a clue to the answer when he states:
"Notwithstanding the emerging distinction between external and internal
self-determination in international law, the discourse of self-determination
is difficult to adapt to the objective of allowing Aboriginal peoples to
participate in Canadian, as well as their own, forms of government.'' This
statement and the surrounding text make it clear that at the heart of
Macklem's reservation with the language of self-determination is the
question concerning the reconciliation of the recognition of indigenous
difference with equal citizenship.42 However, it may be that Macklem's
concern is not resolved by choosing the language of equality over self-
determination. Rather, what is needed is discussion, on the one hand, of the
just reconciliation of a constitutional commitment to equality with the
recognition of multiple and differentiated citizenship rights and, on the
other, a relational reconceptualization of self-determination that does not
simply internalize into the Canadian constitutional framework separatist
visions of each self exercising self-determination.
In fact, there is a double reconciliation at stake in the recognition
of indigenous difference in the constitution of Canada: the reconciliation
of differentiated civic rights with civic equality and the recognition of
40 See Indigenous Difference, ibid. at 34-40 for Macklem's discussion of self-determination.
41 Ibid. at 39.
42 To appreciate this link see ibid. at 288.
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differentiated jurisdictional rights with Canadian unity. Similarly,
distinctions need to be made both between the jurisdictional and civic rights
dimensions of constitutional power and among Aboriginal peoples as
constitutional entities, as individual citizens of Aboriginal nations, and
those who identify as Aboriginal by virtue of their descent from members
of Aboriginal nations but who do not or cannot (for reasons that deserve
to be explored) claim or exercise Aboriginal citizenship. My concern with
Macklem's argument is that it tends to elide a number of these distinctions.
In many cases, these dimensions and references overlap; nonetheless, they
should be distinguished conceptually because they implicate different rights
claims, and sometimes different histories and normative justifications.
These distinctions and the relevant histories that contextualize Aboriginal
claims for differentiated rights and jurisdictions need to be worked through
to make sense of the justice "of allowing Aboriginal peoples to participate
in Canadian, as well as their own, forms of government."43
Macklem is absolutely correct to say that the question of why
indigenous peoples should be entitled to both rights of self-government and
autonomy and the right to continue to participate in political structures
open to all Canadian citizens rests not simply on the right to self-
determination but on the constitutional significance of the four social facts
that comprise indigenous difference. 4 However, he makes the same point
in relation to the principle of equality. In other words, eschewing the
language of self-determination may not provide the best route to resolving
the concern that leads Macklem to choose equality rather than self-
determination as the axiological principle in his argument. In fact, it may
be, as suggested in my second critique, that Macklem's argument needs the
idea of self-determination to make sense of the ultimate value and meaning
of indigenous peoples struggle for a redistribution of constitutional power
in Canada.
None of these criticisms displace Macklem's argument. They merely
provide a possible further conceptualization of his own argument and the
directions in which it can, and perhaps should, be taken to strengthen the
normative reasons for supporting the recognition of distinctive Aboriginal
rights and jurisdictions in the constitution of Canada.
Throughout this review, I have focused on a few fundamental
aspects of Macklem's book-his sense of the constitutional enterprise and
his approach to constitutional reasoning. These are the aspects that in my
reading theoretically and normatively integrate the whole. There are,
though, as earlier stated, a number of different levels on which one can
43 Ibid. at 39.
44 See ibid. at 40.
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read the work and my own reading is certainly not exhaustive. Rather, it is
meant as one contribution to a larger conversation that Macklem's book
deserves to spark in the imagination of lawyers, philosophers, and citizens,
both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal, as he tries to communicate the deep
normative reasons why indigenous difference matters and should be
recognized as a constitutionally significant reality in a legal order that does
not presume to be justice incarnate but is consciously struggling-through
the imperfect words and worlds to which we are mortally bound-for
greaterjustice and humanity. Questioning the justice of the legal order does
not imply scepticism about the possibility of justice nor the negation of
everything that is of value in Canadian constitutional traditions, but rather
commitment to and humility before a great unfinished task.
